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TELEVISION IN THE COURTROOM:
MIGHTIER THA N THE PEN?
Richard P. Matsch*

NoT TV: TELEVISION, JusTICE, AND THE CouRTS. By
Ronald L. Goldfarb. New York: New York University Press. 1998.
Pp. xxiv, 238. $24.95.

TV OR

In his Introduction, author Ronald L. Goldfarb1 explains that
his purpose is to address all the arguments advanced against tele
vised trials, cover the points made by proponents of televised trials,
and find a sensible solution to what he believes is the fundamental
issue: "How can we best blend new media technologies with our
traditional and revered commitment to democracy and justice?" (p.
xxiv). He ends the book with this prospective paragraph:
I expect that all the courtrooms of the future - state and federal,
trial and appellate - will be equipped with cameras. I suggest that all
trials should be available for broadcast - as is generally the case in
most states. A publicly run, noncommercial channel, like the one in
Washington state, would present all proceedings, pursuant to legal
rules. Future viewers, on their sophisticated new home or office "in
struments" (a new-breed computer screen or television set), could
tune into any case anywhere, anytinie. The archival record of all trials
would be available to the public. The right to oppose the broadcast of
any trial should be available to a defendant, witness, juror, or partici
pating lawyer. The circumstances under which a judge could grant
such a request could be set by the legislature or the court system it
self, but all guidelines and limitations on the general presumptive con
stitutional right to publicize public proceedings would have to be
determined ultimately by the Supreme Court. The visibility of the
judicial system is in the public interest and in the overall interests of
justice. [p. 188]
Mr. Goldfarb's journey to this conclusion begins with re
counting "excessively publicized criminal trials" (p. 3) in this coun
try's history, from the libel case of John Peter Zenger to the murder
trial of O.J. Simpson (pp. 3-15). Unusual public interest in many of
the cases was due to the preexisting celebrity status of the victim or
the accused. For example, the fame of the advocates and the clash
of cultures made the Scopes trial the center of national attention
(pp. 7-8). Most often, the subject matter of the case provided the
* Chief Judge, United States District Court for the District of Colorado. A.B. 1951, J.D.
1953, University of Michigan. - Ed.
1. Ronald L. Goldfarb is a Washington, D.C. attorney and author.
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opportunity for the press to appease the public's prurient or morbid
interest. The transformation of notable trials into notorious events
thus occurred long before the advent of television technology.
The tension between the societal values of a free press and a fair
trial is explored with objectivity in the Second Chapter. The pro
tective procedures of continuance, change of venue, voir dire, and
jury instructions are fairly described together with the corrective
procedures of mistrial, reversal of conviction, and orders for new
trial. The principal Supreme Court cases addressing these conflict
ing constitutional rights are accurately summarized.
The book provides a comprehensive review of the development
of televised trials in state courts after the Supreme Court's ruling in
Chandler v. Florida,2 rejecting any per se prohibition of cameras in
the courtroom (pp. 64-84). The work of researchers in conducting
surveys and simulations, and the expressed views and opinions of
judges, lawyers, and jurors who have participated in televised trials,
are generally supportive of the movement to televise. An entire
chapter is devoted to the operation of Court TV (pp. 124-53).
There can be no dispute about the fundamental values served by
transparency in the adjudication of civil disputes and the prosecu
tion of criminal charges. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the
United States Constitution protect the interests of the accused in a
public trial of criminal charges, and the Supreme Court has recog
nized a qualified First Amendment right of public access to court
proceedings.3 Public confidence in the courts and acceptance of the
fairness of the system depend upon open trials. There is an ad
ditional value, recognized by Chief Justice Burger in the following
passage written almost twenty years ago:
Civilized societies withdraw both from the victim and the vigilante
the enforcement of criminal laws, but they cannot erase from people's
consciousness the fundamental, natural yearning to see justice done
- or even the urge for retribution. The crucial prophylactic aspects
of the administration of justice cannot function in the dark; no com
munity catharsis can occur if justice is "done in a corner [or] in any
covert manner." It is not enough to say that results alone will satiate
the natural community desire for "satisfaction." A result considered
2. 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
3. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980). The right is not,
however, absolute. Under limited circumstances it must yield to the fair trial rights of the
accused, the protection of witnesses, the preservation of specific privileges, and the secrecy of
grand jury proceedings. See, e.g., Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 636-37 (1990) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (noting the government's interest in protecting the secrecy of grand jury pro
ceedings); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1986) (holding that a
defendant's right to a fair trial can limit media access to criminal proceedings); Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 608-09 (1982) (acknowledging that protec
tion of crime victims who testify in a sex-offense trial is a compelling interest); Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972) ("Despite the fact that news gathering may be hampered, the
press is regularly excluded from grand jury proceedings . . . . ).
"
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untoward may undermine public confidence, and where the trial has
been concealed from public view an unexpected outcome can cause a
reaction that the system at best has failed and at worst has been cor
rupted. To work effectively, it is important that society's criminal pro
cess "satisfy the appearance of justice," and the appearance of justice
can best be provided by allowing people to observe it.4
Mr. Goldfarb makes a policy argument for televised trials by
pointing out that the print press filters the reportage of trials and
can easily distort the public's perception by its inclusions, exclu
sions, and the slant of a story (pp. 168-72). Full access to the entire
trial is seen as avoiding editorial influence and giving the viewers
the opportunity to reach their own conclusions. The weakness of
this supposed preference is in the assumption that there is an appre
ciable audience for viewing complete, unedited coverage of court
proceedings.
Television is an entertainment medium and much of what is
done in even the most dramatic of cases is tedious and boring to all
but the most interested. There has been little use of camera access
provided by the state courts. What the public sees most often are
bits of videotape fitted into the formats of national and local news
programming. Indeed, television coverage is determined by the
same editorial influences as the print press, but the possibility for
distortion is far greater due to the power of pictorial reporting.

Mr. Goldfarb argues that the First Amendment mandates equal
access to the courts for all media and that there can be no "princi
pled basis" upon which to discriminate against cameras.5 Yet he
recognizes the special power of television to impact our culture. He
quotes Marshall McLuhan's observation that " ' [s]ocieties have al
ways been shaped more by the nature of the media by which men
communicate than by the content of the communication' " (p. 175;
footnote omitted). In a Chapter entitled "A Thing Observed, a
Thing Changed" (pp. 96-123), Mr. Goldfarb acknowledges that ob
servation affects the behavior of those being observed, and he is
optimistic that increased socially acceptable behavior results.
At present, the print press and the broadcasters of radio and
television signals have not achieved parity in access to coverage of
some events. In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the Supreme Court
upheld FCC regulation of offensive language in radio broadcasting
because of the intrusive nature of the medium.6 Differential treat
ment of television was expressly supported in Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v . FCC; the distinction rests in part on the public
4. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571-72 (citations omitted).
5. See p. 187 (citing Kelli L. Sager & Karen N. Frederiksen, Televising the Judicial Branch:
In Furtherance of the Public's First Amendment Rights, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1519 (1996)).
6. 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978).
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interest in the limited number of available frequencies.7 The in
creased capacity and other technological changes in cable and satel
lite television, as well as the rise of the Internet, \vill undoubtedly
affect future debate.8
There is an obvious inconsistency in Mr. Goldfarb's First
Amendment contention and his willingness to concede the right of
trial participants to oppose broadcasts. He expresses approval of
the restrictions and limitations adopted by the states without any
discussion of how they differ from the more limited authority of
courts to conduct closed hearings and seal records.9 That conces
sion is an implicit acknowledgment that there is something different
about televising trials.
Mr. Goldfarb appreciates the potential for commercial and
political exploitation when trials are exposed to television. He rec
ognizes the negative effects of interspersing film clips among com
mercials and the other staples of the mighty news. That sensitivity
leads him to suggest broadcast by public, noncommercial channels
(p. 188). He fails to consider the inability to control or restrict sig
nal pirating and other reproduction methods.
A trial record, however made, is not subject to copyright protec
tion. If there is sufficient public interest, copies can be made read
ily and used indiscriminately. Just as trial transcripts quickly
become available on the Internet, so too would these trial tapes made either at the courthouse or from the signal telecast on the
court-authorized channel - be republished. If there is a First
Amendment right of access for television equivalent to the print
press, by what authority can the court exclude all but its own cam
eras? And once made public, the First Amendment surely would
prohibit any attempt to restrict republication or use of the film.
The Supreme Court made clear in Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart
that a prior restraint on publication of information is qualitatively
different from limiting the means to acquire it. to

It must be admitted that much of the opposition to broadcasting
trial proceedings is intuitive. Neither side of this debate can pro7. 395 U.S. 367, 385, 388-89 (1969) (upholding the FCC's "fairness doctrine" requiring
television and radio stations to allow reply time to answer personal attacks and political edi
torials); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994) (noting prior
Supreme Court cases have permitted more intrusive regulation of broadcast speakers than of
speakers in other media).
8. See, e.g., Stephen C. Jacques, Comment, Reno v. ACLU: Insulating the Internet, the
First Amendment, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 1945, 1961-65 (1997).
9. See p. 188 ("The right to oppose the broadcast of any trial should be available to a
defendant, witness, juror, or participating lawyer.").

10. 427 U.S. 539, 556-70 (1976); see also New York Tnnes Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713, 714 (1971) ('"Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a
heavy presumption against its constitutional validity."') (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
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vide valid scientifically supported evidence to buttress its view on
whether the increased visibility of justice affects the quality of jus
tice. What the opponents can say is that television has transformed
the nature of everything that it has portrayed to the public. The
political process, from candidate selection, through campaigns and
even governance, is radically different. Sports have changed to ac
commodate the huge audiences viewing through this medium and
instant replay of questionable judgment calls has eroded the au
thority of game officials. The morals and mores of our society and
the fabric of our culture have been changed by the technology of
television and ever-changing forms of electronic communication.
Mr. Goldfarb wonders at the reticence of the federal courts, sug
gesting that the failure to follow the forty-eight states that permit
camera coverage is ironic given that federal judges have life tenure
and many state judges are elected or serve terms with reappoint
ment dependent upon public approval (pp. 76, 84-85). He does not
acknowledge that the constitutional purpose of life appointment for
federal judges is protection from political pressures,11 including the
power of the news industry to influence the process of adjudication.
The American jury trial is unique to this country. It has evolved
over centuries of human experience. Procedural controls, the ex
clusionary rules of evidence, established protocols of courtroom de
corum, and the professionalism of the advocates competing in the
adversarial format are protections against the passions, prejudices,
and other frailties of the humans participating in any given trial.
Tradition and experience caution us in considering any changes, and
those who seek to amplify the force of public opinion by adding an
electronic audience bear a heavy burden of proof. They must show
that the search for justice will not be transformed into just another
spectacle for mass amusement. This book does not meet that
burden.

11. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58 (1982)
(quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 489 (Alexander Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed., 1888)).

